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A CALL TO REJECT THE NEUROLOGICAL
STANDARD IN THE DETERMINATION OF
DEATH AND ABANDON THE
DEAD DONOR RULE
Lauren j Riley *
INTRODUCTION
Advances in life-saving technologies coupled with the growing
demand for solid organs have caused the medical community to chal-
lenge its traditional understanding of death. Today, most states have
adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA),' which
prescribes two criteria for determining death. The UDDA states that a
person is dead when he or she "has sustained either (1) irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem."2 The Act further specifies that the determination of death
"must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards."3
These two standards have become known as the cardiopulmonary
standard and the neurological standard, respectively.
But the standard for determining death was not always twofold.
Prior to the second half of the twentieth century, people had long
understood death according to the cardiopulmonary standard, that is,
"when a person's heart and circulatory system have permanently and
irreversibly ceased to function."4 However, during the second half of
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2013; Bachelor of Arts in
Economics & Political Science, Providence College, 2010. I would like to offer my
sincere gratitude to Professor John Robinson for his invaluable guidance throughout
the research and editing phases of this Note. I would also like to thank my family for
their unwavering love and support and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
sacrifices in editing this work.
1 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT §1 (1981), 12A U.L.A. 777 (2008).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Seema K. Shah & Franklin G. Miller, Can We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions in
the Determination of Death, 36 Am. J. L. & MED. 540, 541 (2010).
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the twentieth century, the advances in intensive care medicine and
the growing demand for vital organs set the stage for the development
of a new way of determining death.5 Specifically, by the mid-1960s,
medical technology had progressed to the point where ventilators
could maintain heart and lung function in patients who had suffered
devastating neurological injuries.6 In addition, "the discovery of
cyclosporine in 1978 is thought to have revolutionized the field of
transplantation" by helping to prevent organ recipients from rejecting
transplanted organs and markedly improving survival rates.7
In 1968, Harvard Medical School created a physician-led commit-
tee to develop a new set of criteria for the determination of death.
The committee's work paved the way for the neurological standard.8
In a paper entitled, A Definition of Irreversible Coma,9 the committee
concluded that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for a certain
type of brain injury can be pronounced dead before their hearts stop
beating.1o
Then in 1981, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethi-
cal Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(Commission) proposed the language for the Uniform Determination
of Death Act in Defining Death: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the
Determination of Death.1 The text accompanying the statute clarified
the relationship between the two alternative standards: "in almost all
cases of human death the traditional standard [cardiopulmonary stan-
dard] should be used, as it always ha[s] been,"12 and "[o]nly in rare
cases in which mechanical ventilation is used to support the breathing
of a severely brain-injured individual . . . should a brain-based stan-
dard be employed."13 However, today, most organs are recovered
5 See id.
6 See Maxine M. Harrington, The Thin Flat Line: Redefining Who Is Legally Dead in
Organ Donation After Cardiac Death, 86 DENv. U. L. REv. 335, 340 (2009).
7 Id. at 343.
8 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF
DEATH 4 (2008), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/death/
index.html.
9 Ad Hoc Comm. of the Harvard Med. Sch. to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 337 (1968).
10 Id. at 339.
11 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDI-
CAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES
IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 73 (1981), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.
edu/pcbe/reports/pastscommissions/defining death.pdf.
12 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 4.
13 Id. at 4-5.
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from donors who meet the neurological criterion.14 The Commis-
sion's model statute was endorsed by the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).1 5
The NCCUSL published the statute under the name "Uniform Deter-
mination of Death Act" and encouraged states to pass it.16 The key
section of the Act reads as follows:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.
A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards.' 7
Even though not all states have adopted the exact language of the
UDDA, they all have some form of legal recognition for a neurological
standard of death.18 This Note argues that we should reject the neu-
rological criterion and return to using only the cardiopulmonary stan-
dard because of the uncertainty surrounding the neurological
standard. Evidence has shown that the patients determined dead by
the neurological standard exhibit a number of integrative functions,
including maintenance of body temperature, proportional growth,
sexual maturation, and elimination of waste. Because the majority of
cadaveric donors are determined dead by the neurological standard,
and the organ supply is already far too low to meet the demand, it is
also necessary to abandon the dead donor rule in order to preserve
the organ transplantation system. In the absence of the dead donor
rule, the ethical integrity of the organ donation process can be
grounded in the constitutional right to personal liberty and the com-
mon law notion of informed consent.
Part I describes the organ donation system, in which the demand
for organs far exceeds the supply. Part II provides a comprehensive
overview of the neurological standard for determining death. It dis-
cusses the biology behind the integrative functioning of the brain, the
cardiopulmonary system, and the respiratory system. It then details
the pathophysiology of total brain failure and the clinical tests physi-
cians use to diagnose the condition. This Part also describes the Com-
mission's rationale for using the neurological standard in the
14 See Harrington, supra note 6, at 336 (citing Eelco F.M. Wijdicks, The Diagnosis
of Brain Death, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1215, 1215-18 (2001)).
15 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 5.
16 See id.
17 UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr § 1 (1981), 12A U.L.A. 777 (2008).
18 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 5-6.
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determination of death. Finally, this Part distinguishes patients with
total brain failure from those in a persistent vegetative state and
makes clear that this Note advocates procuring organs only from
those with total brain failure and not from patients in a persistent
vegetative state.
Part III outlines the main criticisms of the neurological standard,
including the uncertainty involved in determining death by this crite-
rion and the fact that patients with total brain failure continue to
exhibit certain integrative functions. Part IV describes the possible
solutions to the problems associated with the neurological standard,
including the use of legal fictions to retain both the neurological crite-
rion and the dead donor rule. This Part also examines Robert
Truog's proposal to reject the neurological standard and abandon the
dead donor rule. Part V proposes a rejection of the neurological crite-
rion based on the medical profession's struggle with the standard and
the risk of the public's confusion about the neurological criterion.
This Part also argues that the rationales for the neurological standard
offered by the Commission and the 2008 President's Council are
undermined by evidence demonstrating a number of integrative func-
tions that patients with total brain failure continue to exhibit.
Because rejecting the neurological standard will cause the supply of
organs-which is already far too low to meet the demand-to plum-
met, this Note also proposes abandoning the dead donor rule, so that
doctors can continue to procure organs from patients who have suf-
fered total brain failure. Part VI argues that the ethical integrity of
organ donation can be grounded in the constitutional right of per-
sonal liberty and the notion of informed consent.
I. THE REALITY OF OUR ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION SYSTEM
Despite debates about the standards for determining death, the
one thing scientists, ethicists, legislators, and doctors can all agree on
is that our current system of organ donation is failing. The demand
for organs far exceeds the supply and thousands of people on the
transplant list die each year. Today, doctors can transplant the heart,
the kidneys, the pancreas, the lungs, the liver, and the intestines.19
Doctors also transplant tissues, including eyes, skin, bone, heart valves,
and tendons.20 However, there are significant obstacles to overcome
before a donor's organs can be transplanted into another person,
including issues of tissue and blood compatibility and organ size, espe-
19 Common Myths of Organ Donation, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http:/
/www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=fact-sheet-7 (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
20 See id.
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cially when the donor or the recipient is a child.21 Further, in the case
of cadaveric organ donation, the focus of this Note, "the potential
donor pool is limited both by cause of death and the health of the
organs upon death." 22
The United States's organ transplantation system is facilitated by
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), which contains data
regarding every organ donation and transplantation occurring in the
United States since 1986.23 UNOS "enables the nation's organ trans-
plant institutions to: [1] register patients for transplants, [2] match
donated organs to waiting patients [, and 3] manage the time-sensi-
tive, life-critical data of all patients, before and after their
transplants." 24
The reality of our organ transplantation system is that the
demand for organs far exceeds the supply. The current waiting list
for organs indicates that the demand for all organs is 122,596,25 but in
2011, only 26,246 organs were donated. 26 Sixty percent of people on
the waiting list will die while waiting for a donor.27 Further, approxi-
mately 300 new candidates are added to the waiting list each month.28
The number of people requiring a life-saving transplant continues to
rise faster than the number of available donors.29 It is interesting to
note that there are almost as many living donors as there are deceased
donors; in 2011, there were 12,958 donors, 7502 of whom were
deceased and 5456 of whom were living.30
21 Sean Arthurs, Comment, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model
Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of Our National Organ Donation Regime,
73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1101, 1105 (2005).
22 Id.
23 Data, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/donation/
index.php?topic=data (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
24 Id.
25 Overall by Organ Current U.S. Waiting List, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES
ADMIN., ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp (in drop down select "Waiting List"; then select "Over-
all by Organ") (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
26 Transplants by Donor Type, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERvs, ADMIN., ORGAN PRO-
CUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latest
Data/step2.asp (in drop down select "Transplant"; then select "Transplants by Donor
Type") (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
27 Arthurs, supra note 21, at 1110 (footnote omitted).
28 FAQs, THE NAT'L NETWORK FOR ORGAN DONORS, http://www.thenationalnet
workoforgandonors.org/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
29 See id.
30 Donors Recovered in the U.S. by Donor Type, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.,
ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.
2012] 1753
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Organ transplants are now performed for more diseases and con-
ditions than ever before.31 The increase in the average lifespan has
resulted in "a larger pool of the people who are statistically most likely
to need organ transplants."3 2 And as Americans live longer lives, the
supply of cadaveric organs will continue to shrink since the elderly's
organs are less suitable for human transplantation than middle-aged
people's organs.33 Further, "[t]ransplantation becomes safer, less
time consuming and more pain free with each passing year," thus
increasing the demand for organs. 34 Finally, organ transplantation is
a more attractive alternative from the financial perspective of insur-
ance companies. As the costs of transplantation have decreased, in
most cases, it has become cheaper than a lifetime regimen of expen-
sive drugs.35
II. THE NEUROLOGICAL STANDARD
A. Terminology
Scholarly literature has used a number of terms to refer to the
neurological standard and it is important to understand the terminol-
ogy in this area. When someone has met the neurological standard
for determining death, this Note will refer to the condition as "total
brain failure."
B. Circulatory and Respiratory Systems
Traditionally, death had been determined by the absence of cir-
culation and respiration, namely, the cardiopulmonary standard.
Under normal circumstances, the presence of these processes is a defi-
nite sign of life, and an understanding of how breathing and circula-
tion operate in healthy individuals will demonstrate why we associate
these functions with life.3 6 The Central Nervous System (CNS), which
is comprised of the brain and the spinal cord, plays an integral role in
breathing and circulation.37 Inhalation is a function of the contrac-
tion of muscles in the thorax or chest cavity.38 This "contraction of
gov/latestData/step2.asp (in drop down select "Donor"; then select "All Donors by
Donor Type") (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
31 Arthurs, supra note 21, at 1111.
32 Id.
33 See id. at 1112.
34 Id. at 1111.
35 Id.
36 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 21.
37 See id. at 25.
38 See id. at 22.
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muscles is [dependent on] a signal sent from the respiratory center of
the CNS."39 The respiratory center of the CNS "is located at the base
of the brainstem, in a structure known as the medulla oblongata."40
Breathing is dependent on the CNS because in order for a person to
inhale, the medulla oblongata must send a signal to the muscles in his
chest cavity.41 When the CNS's respiratory center is destroyed, the
person permanently loses the ability to breathe.42
In patients declared dead according to the neurological standard,
the respiratory and circulatory functions are dependent on the exter-
nal support of a ventilator.43 The ventilator takes the place of the
contraction of the respiratory muscles "by increasing and decreasing
the pressure in the lung cavities so that oxygen-rich" air will travel in
and carbon dioxide-rich air will travel out, rendering contraction of
the respiratory muscles unnecessary. 44 However, the exchange of
gases that the ventilator maintains will not benefit the patient unless
the blood is kept circulating as well. 4 5 Oxygen coming in through the
lungs "must be transported to the tissues that need it, and ... carbon
dioxide must be removed [from the tissues] to the lungs for expulsion
from the body."46 The ventilator will help the patient only if the heart
is working, pumping blood through the arteries, veins, and
capillaries. 4 7
Although the mechanics of the circulatory system are similar to
the mechanics of the external respiratory system, there are important
differences. One of those differences is that "there is no part of the
CNS that is absolutely indispensable for heart contractions in the way
that the respiratory center in the brainstem is absolutely indispensable
for the muscular contractions involved in breathing." 4 8 Although the
CNS is not "absolutely indispensable" to the circulatory system, in
healthy individuals, stimuli from the CNS will change the rate and
strength of contractions. In particular, "the heart rate will change in
response to danger, excitement, or other stimuli. But even when
there is no stimulus whatsoever from the CNS, the heart can continue
39 Id. at 25.
40 Id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 35.
43 See id. at 21.
44 Id. at 27.
45 See id.
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 Id. at 28.
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to beat. "4 9 However, in a patient with total brain failure, the circula-
tory system needs the ventilator indirectly to effect the exchange of
gases, because in order for "the heart muscle to continue to function,
. . . its cells, like all other cells in the body, need oxygen to stay
alive."50
C. Understanding the Pathophysiology of Total Brain Failure
When a doctor diagnoses a patient with total brain failure, the
doctor believes "that the brainstem and the structures above it have
been destroyed and therefore have lost the capacity to function ever
again."5 1 In many cases, however, this destruction of the brain was not
a function of the initial injury but came about through a series of self-
perpetuating events that progressively damaged brain tissue and ulti-
mately destroyed the brainstem.5 2
The catalyst for this series of damaging events is elevated pressure
in the cranial vault that holds the brain.53 The most common injuries
that lead to total brain failure all cause severe damage to the tissue of
the brain, which leads to an "abnormal accumulation of fluid," also
known as "edema."54 With no space to expand in the cranial vault,
"the swelling brain suffers steady increases in intracranial pressure
(ICP)."66 The elevated ICP then prevents oxygen-rich blood from
entering the cranial cavity and thus deprives brain tissues of essential
nutrients.5 6 This lack of nutrients leads to more edema and swell-
ing.5 7 The brain then herniates through the tentorium and foramen
magnum, which crushes the brain stem and leads to the functional
losses discussed above.5 8
Another term used to describe this process is "total brain infarc-
tion."5 9 Infarction means "insufficiency of arterial or venous blood
supply," and thus, the "total destruction of the brain has occurred due
to infarction or lack of blood supply."60 Clinical tests that establish
loss of all brainstem reflexes can show that the rest of the brain has
49 Id.
50 Id. at 29.
51 Id. at 35.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 35-36.
54 Id. at 36.
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 Id. (footnote omitted).
59 See id
60 Id.
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also been irreversibly compromised, because the brainstem is often
the last structure affected by the self-perpetuating damage.6 '
D. Clinical Tests to Determine Total Brain Failure
Neurologists perform a series of clinical tests to determine if a
patient exhibits any sign of brainstem function.62 First, "other possi-
ble causes for the absence of neurological function" must be ruled
out.6 3 It must be determined that the cause of the patient's injury is
not hypothermia, drug intoxication, poisoning, hypoxia, or any other
cause that produces similar effects to those of total brain failure. 64
Second, the patient must be in a completely unresponsive coma,
which means that the patient's eyes must be closed and the patient
must not exhibit any response to verbal or painful stimuli.65
Once other possible causes have been ruled out and it has been
determined that the patient is in an unresponsive coma, the neurolo-
gist will perform a series of diagnostic tests, which involve "unrespon-
siveness, apnea, and . . . cranial nerve reflexes."66 Apnea is the
"technical term for an inability to breathe,"67 and the apnea test is
"[o]ne of the most important tests of brainstem function."6 8  It
"involves removing the patient from the ventilator to determine
whether the patient has any neurological drive to breathe."69
Another set of exams that neurologists perform tests the patient's
"automatic responses or 'brainstem reflexes,'" including the "gag
reflex, the cough reflex, and the reflex to move the eyes ... under
certain conditions."7 0 If any of these reflexes are present, the patient
has not suffered total brain failure.7 1 If no neurological function is
61 See id. at 37.
62 See Robert D. Truog, Brain Death-Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Aban-
don, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 273 (2007).
63 Id.
64 See id.; PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 31.
65 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 30.
66 Mike Nair-Collins, Death, Brain Death, and the Limits of Science: Why the Whole-
Brain Concept of Death Is a Flawed Public Policy, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 667, 668 (2010).
67 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICs, supra note 8, at 32.
68 Truog, supra note 62, at 273.
69 Id. (emphasis added); see also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8,
at 32 ("Although all patients who receive ventilator support need the machine's help
to breathe, most are not so injured that they have no drive to breathe whatsoever.
The purpose of the apnea test . . is to establish that the patient has no drive to bring
air into the body even when the sensors in the brainstem are receiving an unambigu-
ous signal that breathing is required.").
70 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 33.
71 See id.
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detected, the physician usually repeats the testing in six to twelve
hours, and if the findings persist, the patient is deemed dead accord-
ing to the neurological standard.72 The Harvard committee also rec-
ommended the use of laboratory tests to confirm total brain failure,
such as an electroencephalogram (EEG)." However, these tests are
optional in the United States.74 Through the use of these tests, physi-
cians can confirm the existence of total brain failure, as distinguished
from a permanent vegetative state (PVS). In contrast to PVS patients,
"no patient diagnosed with 'total brain failure' has ever recovered the
capacity to breathe spontaneously or shown any sign of
consciousness."7 5
E. 1981 President's Commission's Rationale for the Neurological Standard
In developing the neurological standard, the Commission relied
on the assumption that the brain controls the integrative functioning
of the human body as a whole. The Commission believed that once
the brain has deteriorated, the death of the body will follow shortly.76
The Commission viewed the brain as the "complex organizer and reg-
ulator of bodily functions."77 The Commission explained that the
heart, the lungs, and the brain are all interrelated and that "the irre-
versible cessation of anyone [sic] very quickly stops the other two and
consequently halts the integrated functioning of the organism as a
whole."78 While the Commission acknowledged some of the functions
that a patient with total brain failure still exhibits, it also contended
that "[e]ven with extraordinary medical care, these functions cannot
be sustained indefinitely-typically, no longer than several days."79
72 See Truog, supra note 62, at 273.
73 See ALASTAIR CAMPBELL ET AL., MEDICAL ETHICS 200 (4th ed. 2005); Alexander
Morgan Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 89 n.11 (1972).
74 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 34. In some other
countries, the imaging tests are mandatory. Id.
75 Id. at 45.
76 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 33.
77 Id. at 34 ("Only the brain can direct the entire organism. Artificial support for
the heart and lungs, which is required only when the brain can no longer control
them, cannot maintain the usual synchronized integration of the body.").
78 Id. at 33 ("Since life is a matter of integrating the functioning of major organ
systems, breathing and circulation are necessary but not sufficient to establish that an
individual is alive. When an individual's breathing and circulation lack neurologic
integration, he or she is dead.").
79 Id. at 35.
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The Commission argued that the traditional means of determin-
ing death, the cardiopulmonary standard, "actually detected an irre-
versible cessation of integrated functioning among the
interdependent bodily systems."80 Thus, the neurological standard
denotes the same thing that the cardiopulmonary standard has
denoted all along, namely the irreversible cessation of the integrated
functioning of the heart, the lungs, and the brain. "When artificial
means of support mask this loss of integration as measured by the old
methods," the Commission explained, "brain-oriented criteria.. . pro-
vide a new window on the same phenomenon."81
F. The Distinction Between Total Brain Failure
and Persistent Vegetative State
It is important to understand the difference between patients
who have suffered total brain failure and patients who are in a persis-
tent vegetative state (PVS), because it is a common misunderstanding
to conflate the two conditions. Patients such as Karen Ann Quinlan,
Nancy Cruzan, and Terry Schiavo, who have been the subject of media
attention because their families wished to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment were all in a PVS, despite the fact that they were consistently
referred to as exhibiting total brain failure.82
The main difference between a patient who has suffered total
brain failure and one in a PVS is that the tests provide evidence to
suggest that the brainstem of a patient with total brain failure is com-
pletely destroyed.83 In contrast, a PVS patient's brainstem, and possi-
bly some parts of the brain above the brainstem, function to some
degree.8 4 Although the initial clinical state of a patient in a PVS may
be similar to that of a patient with total brain failure, the clinical tests
described above will help doctors discriminate between these two con-
ditions. 85 Although the PVS patient may "initially be in the same ...
unresponsive coma as the patient with total brain failure, the [PVS]
patient will eventually emerge from this coma and display the ... signs
of the vegetative state," including opening his eyes, experiencing the
sleep/wake cycles, moving his limbs, breathing spontaneously, and, in
80 Id. at 33.
81 Id. "On this view, the heart and lungs are not important as basic prerequisites
to continued life but rather because the irreversible cessation of their functions shows
that the brain [has] ceased functioning." Id. at 34.
82 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 42-43.
83 See id. at 43.
84 See id.
85 See id.
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some cases, exhibiting minimal responsiveness to painful stimuli.8 6
The most striking difference between the PVS patient and the patient
with total brain failure is that the PVS patient does not need the con-
tinual support of the respirator to breathe. Because the PVS patient's
brainstem is not completely destroyed, the medulla oblongata can
continue to facilitate breathing in the PVS patient.87 A patient in a
PVS can survive for many years in this condition if sustaining treat-
ment and nursing care are provided.88 This Note does not advocate
procuring organs from PVS patients. It proposes the removal of
organs only from patients who have suffered total brain failure.
G. Why Donors with Total Brain Failure Make Better Donors
than Cardiac Arrest Donors
One of the motivating factors behind the Harvard committee's
neurological definition of death was the gap between the supply and
demand of vital organs.89 The definition the committee proposed was
a function of this necessity. Patients deemed dead by the neurological
standard are ideal organ donors because their organs are still per-
fusing at the time of procurement.90 That is, the organ tissue is still
retrieving nutrients from the flow of blood through the vessels of the
body, preserving the quality of the organs. In the case of donors
determined dead by the cardiopulmonary standard, the poorer organ
quality is "caused by warm ischemia time, [which is] the period in
which the donor's organs begin to die from lack of an oxygenated
blood supply."91 This is why, in 2007, about ninety-two percent of all
donated cadaveric organs came from donors declared dead by the
neurological standard.92
86 Id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See Ad Hoc Comm. of the Harvard Med. Sch. to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death, supra note 9, at 337 ("There are two reasons why there is need for a
definition: ... (2) Obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy
in obtaining organs for transplantation."); see also HANS JONAS, Against the Stream: Com-
ments on the Definition and Redefinition ofDeath, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS FROM ANCIENT
CREED To TECHNOLOGICAL MAN, 132, 132 (1974) ("The [Harvard] report leaves no
doubt of the practical reasons 'why there is need for a definition,' naming these two:
relief of patient, kin, and medical resources from the burdens of indefinitely pro-
longed coma; and removal of controversy on obtaining organs for transplantation.").
90 See Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 570.
91 Harrington, supra note 6, at 340 (footnote omitted).
92 SeeJane E. Brody, The Solvable Problem of Organ Shortages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2007, at F7.
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III. CRITICISMS OF THE NEUROLOGICAL STANDARD
Although all states have adopted the neurological standard in
some form and it is widely accepted as a legal definition of death,
evidence has emerged that calls into question the validity of equating
total brain failure with death. The chief justification for that equa-
tion-that patients diagnosed with total brain failure have lost the
integrated functioning of the organism as a whole-has been criti-
cized as conceptually unsound.93 Scholars have attacked the neuro-
logical standard by citing scientific evidence that several significant
life functions continue in people diagnosed with total brain failure.94
There have also been cases in which people with total brain failure
persisted on life support for years.95
A. Uncertainty in Determining Death (Hans Jonas)
Soon after the Harvard committee proposed the neurological
standard, philosopher Hans Jonas disagreed with the committee's
equation of irreversible coma and death.96 In his 1970 essay, Against
the Stream, Jonas contended that the committee had defined "not
death, the ultimate state, itself, but a criterion for permitting [death]
to take place unopposed-e.g., by turning off the respirator."97 Thus,
for Jonas, total brain failure did not represent death, but merely a
state in which it was thought to be appropriate to let death occur by
removing life-sustaining support and allowing the functions of the
heart and lungs to cease. Jonas criticized the Harvard committee's
definition of death as motivated by its desire to ensure sufficient
organ availability.98
Jonas argued that because there is evidence that a patient with
total brain failure may still exhibit some signs of life, we should be
cautious in declaring that patient dead.99 He explained that the real-
ity of death may be "imprecise in itself, or the knowledge obtainable
of it may be [imprecise]," and "[t]o acknowledge such a state of affairs
is more adequate to it than a precise definition, which does violence
93 See Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 548 (footnote omitted).
94 See infra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
95 Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 548.
96 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 53.
97 JONAS, supra note 89 at 133.
98 See id. ("I contend that, pure as this interest, viz., to save other lives, is in itself,
its intrusion into the theoretical attempt to define death makes the attempt impure;
and the Harvard Committee should never have allowed itself to adulterate the purity
of its scientific case by baiting it with the prospect of this extraneous--though
extremely appealing-gain.").
99 See id. at 138.
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to it."100 Jonas recognized the uncertainty in declaring the death of
patients who have suffered total brain failure and doubted the validity
of the practice. He wrote:
We do not know with certainty the borderline between life and
death, and a definition cannot substitute for knowledge. Moreover,
we have sufficient grounds for suspecting that the artificially sup-
ported condition of the comatose patient may still be one of life,
however reduced-i.e., for doubting that, even with the brain func-
tion gone, he is completely dead.101
In light of this uncertainty over whether the patient is in fact
dead, Jonas advocated for a conservative course of action. He con-
cluded, "In this state of marginal ignorance and doubt the only course
to take is to lean over backward toward the side of possible life."1 O2
B. Integrative Functions Exhibited After Total
Brain Failure (Alan Shewmon)
Alan Shewmon has also challenged the use of the neurological
standard in the determination of death. Shewmon revealed two flaws
in the criterion. First, his research demonstrated that total brain fail-
ure does not immediately lead to the cessation of heartbeat or bodily
disintegration, 0 3 as supporters of the neurological standard had
claimed.' 0 4 Secondly, Shewmon's research showed that a number of
integrative functions continue in patients who are diagnosed with
total brain failure.105
The 1981 Commission's rationale for employing the neurological
standard in determining death was that the brain was the central inte-
grator of the body and that when the functions of the brain are lost,
the cessation of heart and lung function is inevitable.10 6 In 1998
Shewmon published an article in Neurology that demonstrated that ces-
sation of heartbeat does not always occur immediately after total brain
failure.' 0 7 Shewmon researched 175 cases in which patients survived
100 Id. at 134.
101 Id. at 138.
102 Id.
103 See D. Alan Shewmon, Chronic "Brain Death": Meta-analysis and Conceptual Conse-
quences, 51 NEUROLOGY 1538, 1542 (1998).
104 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
105 See D. Alan Shewmon, The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard
Biological Rationale for Equating "Brain Death" with Death, 26 J. MED. & PHIL. 457, 467
(2001).
106 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 33.
107 See Shewmon, supra note 103, at 1539.
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for a week or longer after suffering total brain failure. 108 Out of the
175 cases, fifty-six had sufficient information for meta-analysis of facts
affecting survival capacity.109 Of those fifty-six meta-analyzed cases,
half of the patients survived more than one month, nearly one-third
more than two months, seven more than six months, and four more
than one year, the record being fourteen and a half years.110
Shewmon thus proposed that "[t]he rapid, inexorable deterioration
in a minority of . . . patients [with total brain failure] . . . is therefore
less attributable to absence of brain function per se than it is to ...
damage to multiple organs, especially the heart."' He went on to con-
clude that "the body's integrative unity derives from mutual interac-
tion among its parts, not from a top-down imposition of one 'critical
organ' upon an otherwise mere bag of organs and tissues."112 Thus,
he argued, "[i]f [total brain failure] is to be equated with human
death ... it must be on some basis more plausible than that the body is
dead."113
Shewmon's second contribution was even more significant. In an
article published in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy in 2001, he
argued that most integrative functions of the body are not mediated
through the brain and persist in at least some patients who had suf-
fered total brain failure.114 In particular, Shewmon found that some
patients with total brain failure were able to maintain homeostasis of
many different chemicals, regulate body temperature only a few
degrees below normal, fight infections, mature sexually, carry a preg-
nancy to term, and exhibit stress responses to unanesthetized incision
for organ retrieval.115
108 See id.
109 See id. at 1542. Meta-analysis combines the results of different studies that
address a set of related research hypotheses.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1544.
112 Id.
113 Id. (emphasis added).
114 See Shewmon, supra note 105, at 467 (providing a list of functions not medi-
ated by the brain and possessed by at least some patients with total brain failure).
115 See id. at 467-68; Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 549. For a complete list of the
integrative functions Shewmon found in patients with total brain failure, see Table 1
infra in the Appendix.
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IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Using Legal Fictions to Retain the Neurological Standard
and the Dead Donor Rule
There are scholars who appreciate the fact that current organ
procurement practice rests on a misunderstanding of the relationship
between the brain and the rest of the body.116 In a 2008 article,
Franklin G. Miller and Seema K Shah proposed that we continue to
use total brain failure as a determination of death, while acknowledg-
ing that total brain failure is not in fact death.117 They suggested
retaining the neurological standard of determining death but advo-
cated greater transparency about the biological realities of total brain
failure.118 They proposed to use a "transparent legal fiction that
admits the truth [that total brain failure is not death] but allows the
existing law to continue to treat people as if they were dead in certain,
well-justified circumstances."' 19 The transparency of the legal fiction
concerning total brain failure would work identically to the transpar-
ent legal fictions with which we are familiar. For example, the law
treats corporations as if they are persons, even though no one really
believes corporations are persons. 120 Likewise, the law would treat
patients with total brain failure as if they were dead in the context of
organ donation, even though everyone would understand that
patients with total brain failure are not in fact dead. This approach
would allow "vital organ transplantation to continue with organs
donated by individuals who are regarded as legally dead but remain
biologically alive or not known with certainty to be dead."121
It is because of the dead donor rule (DDR) that Shah and Miller
proposed their acknowledged-legal-fictions approach rather than
advocating abandonment of the neurological standard altogether. 122
The DDR is a "widely endorsed moral and legal constraint stipulating
that transplantation of vital organs can only occur after a donor's
death because it cannot be the cause of the donor's death."123 The
DDR is part of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and a number of
116 See Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 548-49.
117 See id. at 573.
118 See id. at 573-74.
119 Id. at 574.
120 See id. at 542.
121 Id. at 573 (emphasis added). The patients would be considered legally dead,
because the neurological standard for determining death would remain.
122 See id. at 577-78.
123 Id. at 543.
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states have codified it into law in one form or another.124 In addition,
homicide laws do not contain exceptions allowing physicians to cause
death in the context of organ donation. 2 5 Shah and Miller noted
that if the neurological standard is rejected and the DDR is aban-
doned, "physicians who remove [ ] organs from patients under the
specified conditions might be subject to liability for criminal homi-
cide." 26 They argued that the major legal change necessary to
achieve complete transparency is too great an obstacle to overcome in
the short term.12 7 Instead, they contended that an "[a] ppeal to trans-
parent legal fictions" would allow us to "preserv[e] the [current] prac-
tice of . . . organ transplantation without the need to formally
abandon the dead donor rule and to change the homicide laws." 12
However, Shah and Miller were quick to qualify their approach as
a short-term solution. They called their solution "a practical policy
choice [and] a compromise that is less than satisfactory."1 29 They
acknowledged that our current practices are incompatible with other
established legal norms, namely the DDR (because patients with total
brain failure are still living), but contended that the "problem . . .
rests with those other norms, not the practices of vital organ dona-
tion."1 30 They conceded that their approach was "theoretically defi-
cient in comparison with a more transparent ethical and legal
approach that abandons the dead donor rule."13' But in the
meantime, Shah and Miller believed the best way to recognize the bio-
logical reality of total brain failure, while still maintaining the organ
donation system, was to employ legal fictions.
124 See id. The 2006 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) revised the acts of 1968
and 1987, but not all states have adopted the 2006 version of the Act. REVISED UNIF.
ANATOMICAL Gwr Acr (2006), 8A U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 2011). It was promulgated to
address, in part, the critical organ shortage by providing additional ways for making
organ, eye, and tissue donation. Id. The original UAGA was introduced in 1968 and
promptly enacted by all states. Id. In 1987, the UAGA was revised and updated, but
only twenty-six states adopted that version. Many states adopted non-uniform amend-
ments to their anatomical gift acts, and the law is no longer consistent. Id. The 2006
revised act was introduced to address changes in federal law and recent developments
in the field of organ donation, in order to better facilitate organ donation. Id.
125 Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 543-44.
126 Id. at 572 (footnote omitted).
127 See id. at 573.
128 Id. at 581.
129 Id. at 583.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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B. Rejecting the Neurological Standard and Abandoning
the Dead Donor Rule
Dr. Robert Truog, a professor of medical ethics, anesthesiology,
and pediatrics at Harvard Medical School and a senior associate in
critical care medicine at Children's Hospital Boston,132 has been at
the forefront of the proposal to reject the neurological standard and
abandon the DDR. In light of the evidence of the integrative func-
tions that patients with total brain failure exhibit, Truog does not
accept that these patients are dead under the neurological crite-
rion.133 However, he also believes that it is morally appropriate to
procure organs from those with total brain failure in certain circum-
stances, namely, when informed consent has been obtained.13 4 Truog
"argue [s] that it is time . . . to face honestly the fact that our current
practices of vital organ donation violate the dead donor rule."13 5
However, he contends that " [t]his does not mean that we are unethi-
cally extracting vital organs from living patients; rather, it means that
we need to develop a coherent alternative ethical account of vital
organ donation." 36
Truog analogizes procuring organs from living patients to with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment from living patients.'37 In employ-
ing this analogy, he argues that withdrawing life support is actually
causing the death of the patient, rather than letting the patient die.13 8
In asserting that withdrawing life support causes the patient to die, he
appeals to the "commion-sense understanding of the causes of particu-
lar events," rather than to "any particular philosophical . . . theory of
causation."' 3 9 He argues that the view that withdrawing life support is
letting a patient die, rather than causing the death of the patient, is
merely a fiction designed to bring the practices of withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment in line with established norms.14 0 Further,
132 THE DIVIsIoN OF MED. ETHICS AT HARV. MED. SCH., http://medethics.med.
harvard.edu/people/trupg/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
133 See Franklin G. Miller & Robert D. Truog, Rethinking the Ethics of Vital Organ
Donations, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 38, 39 (2008).
134 Robert D. Truog, supra note 62, at 279 (comparing a physician's act of remov-
ing a ventilator with the consent of the patient or surrogate to procurement of organs
under the same circumstances).
135 Miller & Truog, supra note 133, at 39.
136 Id. at 40.
137 See id. at 40-41.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 40.
140 See Franklin G. Miller et al., The Dead Donor Rule: Can It Withstand Critical Scru-
tiny?, 35J. MED. & PHIL. 299, 300 (2010).
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Truog contends that the right to forgo life support has nothing to do
with whether terminating the treatment is the cause of the death.141
Rather, he notes, this right is "based on patient autonomy and
informed consent" and "grounded in the personal liberty and self-
determination protected by the U.S. [C]onstitution as well as by the
common law doctrine of bodily integrity, which makes treatment with-
out informed consent the tort of battery."14 2
Truog argues that abandoning the DDR is not as radical as it may
seem. Because our current practices already violate the DDR, he con-
tends, it is a change only at the terminological level, for it puts our
justifications in line with our practices.14 3 He posits that an honest
consideration of our current practices will "pave the way for the seem-
ingly radical and controversial position of abandoning the dead donor
rule."' 44
However, Truog's approach is not without qualifications. The
"key protection" for the integrity of the process is consent to organ
donation, along with a "valid decision to withdraw life support."1 45
Truog explains that the "consent process should be free from conflict
of interest: consent should not be solicited by clinicians who are
involved in extracting the organs or caring for the recipient." 146 Fur-
ther, he explains that there are only two situations in which removing
a vital organ from a living patient may be morally justifiable: "when
the patient is either permanently unconscious or imminently
dying." 47 He argues that in these situations, the patient should be
allowed to decide "whether [he] want[s] to accept the harm of an
earlier death in order to bestow the benefits of transplantable organs
to others in need."148
Ultimately, however, Truog believes that "any changes to current
practice are very unlikely in the near future."l 49 He contends that the
solution will not come from "philosophical argument, but from tech-
nological advance," and notes that "research is being done to over-
come the immunological barriers to transplantation between
species."o5 0 He predicts that we will implant animal organs in humans
141 See Miller & Truog, supra note 133, at 41.
142 Id. at 41.
143 See id. at 38.
144 Id. at 42.
145 Id. at 44.
146 Id.
147 Truog, supra note 62, at 278.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 280.
150 Id.
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before we remedy the current legal and ethical ramifications of the
determination of death in the context of vital organ donation. 15 1
V. REJECTION OF THE NEUROLOGICAL STANDARD
Although the concept of total brain failure has been widely
accepted, on close examination it is counterintuitive to our under-
standing of death. 152 The range of integrative biological functioning
that patients diagnosed with total brain failure continue to exhibit is
too great an obstacle to declaring these patients dead. 53 In addition,
patients with total brain failure have a beating heart, are warm to the
touch, and are breathing (with the help of a ventilator) *154 This Note
proposes a rejection of the neurological standard.
A. Medical Professionals' Struggle with Total Brain Failure
The medical community struggles with the neurological standard
in two ways. First, a number of medical professionals likely to be
involved in the organ transplantation process are unfamiliar with the
neurological criterion and do not understand its implications. 15 5 Sec-
ond, those who do understand the criterion, but do not agree with it,
are forced to compromise their professional integrity in order to com-
ply with the legal standard.' 5 6
Many health professionals, including those actively involved in
organ transplantation, are confused about the current criteria for
determining death. 15 7 In addition, most do not believe patients who
have suffered total brain failure are in fact dead, but are comfortable
with the process of organ procurement anyway because the patients
are permanently unconscious or imminently dying.' 5 8 Thus, the "ethi-
cally salient feature [is] not whether the patients [are] alive or dead,
but [what] their clinical condition and prognosis" is.159
Further, some professionals who do not agree with the legal defi-
nition of death have "had to pay the price of self-delusion."1 60
Although these physicians know that the neurological standard is the
151 See id.
152 See id. at 273-74.
153 See supra Part III.B.
154 See Truog, supra note 62, at 275.
155 See Nair-Collins, supra note 66, at 677.
156 See Truog, supra note 62, at 277.
157 See Nair-Collins, supra note 66, at 677; Truog, supra note 62, at 274.
158 See Truog, supra note 62, at 274.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 277.
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legal definition of death, they have a hard time reconciling this with
the biological realities of patients diagnosed with total brain failure,16 '
namely the integrative functions these patients continue to exhibit.
Robert Truog describes his own struggle with the total brain failure
criterion in this way:
Despite my own reservations about the concept of [total brain fail-
ure], I strongly support the potentially life-saving opportunities pro-
vided by organ transplantation. In the absence of an alternative, I
must therefore make the diagnosis of [total brain failure] and
explain it to families in a way that conveys confidence and certainty.
This dilemma has created a schizophrenic split between my intellec-
tual commitments and the realities of clinical practice.16 2
Truog understands that the neurological standard allows him to
begin organ procurement, but he struggles with the criterion because
he does not think that the patient with total brain failure is in fact
dead in the biological sense of the term.
B. The Risk of the Public's Confusion About Total Brain Failure
It is likely that the public is uneducated about the legal determi-
nation of death, specifically the neurological standard. This is espe-
cially true if the neurological criterion is an unacknowledged legal
fiction, as some have argued, employed to support the high demand
for vital organs.16 Generally, there is nothing wrong with legal fic-
tions when they are transparent. However, the problem with the legal
fiction concerning the neurological criterion is that it is unacknowl-
edged. That is, it is presented as a fact that patients who have suffered
total brain failure are dead.164
Currently, the viability of our organ transplantation system hinges
on the public's belief that the organ donation process is conducted
professionally, with informed consent, and only after the patient is
dead. However, our current practices already violate the DDR.165
Patients determined dead by the neurological standard continue to
exhibit a number of integrative functions, including maintenance of
body temperature and elimination of waste.1 66 The organ transplanta-
161 See Shewmon, supra note 105, at 459 ("[M]any health care professionals,
including those involved in transplantation ... remain unconvinced, at least sublimi-
nally, that [total brain failure] is really death.").
162 Truog, supra note 62, at 277.
163 See Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 541-42.
164 See id; Nair-Collins, supra note 66, at 675.
165 See Miller & Truog, supra note 133, at 39.
166 See Shewmon, supra note 105, at 467.
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tion system is completely dependent on voluntary donation, and thus,
if people feel they are being "tricked," or that their doctors are not
being completely truthful, they may be unwilling to donate their
organs or the organs of a family member. Thus, if information about
the biological realities of patients diagnosed with total brain failure
becomes more widely available, the situation may become unstable.
167 There is a risk that organ transplantation could be significantly cut
back if the public begins to understand that the current practice of
organ transplantation conflicts with the DDR, a notion the system pur-
ports to respect.168
Further, the current approach is keeping important moral issues
out of the realm of democratic debate.169 "[A] relatively small group
of physicians and bioethicists have made a normative judgment about
a fundamental moral issue involving life, death, and the value of bio-
logically living human beings at the end of life."17 0 The neurological
criterion has been presented as a "factual claim that medical scientists
have discovered, and about which the general public has no standing
to determine,"1 7 ' despite the fact that patients who have been diag-
nosed with total brain failure continue to exhibit integrative func-
tions. This evidence has simply been ignored because the
neurological standard is actually a claim about the moral propriety of
procuring organs from patients in this medical state.1 72 Therefore,
the scientific evidence does not affect it, because that evidence does
not change the moral analysis of the situation. Regardless of whether
one agrees with the underlying value judgment that organ removal
from patients with total brain failure is morally acceptable under some
conditions, the problem is that this judgment has been taken out of
the public debate by simply equating total brain failure with death.
C. Unpersuasive Rationales for the Neurological Standard
The 1981 Commission's rationale for recommending the neuro-
logical criterion is unconvincing in light of the evidence that
Shewmon and others have discovered regarding the integrative func-
tions that persist in patients with total brain failure. The Commission
was mistaken about two aspects of total brain failure-timing and
implications. First, the Commission believed that once the brain has
167 See Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 566.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 565.
170 Nair-Collins, supra note 66, at 676.
171 Id. at 675.
172 See id. at 676.
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deteriorated, death of the body will follow shortly, namely, that the
heart and lungs will cease to function.173 The Commission explained
that the heart, the lungs, and the brain share a very special relation-
ship such that "the irreversible cessation of anyone [sic] very quickly
stops the other two and consequently halts the integrated functioning
of the organism as a whole."1 74 While the Commission acknowledged
some of the functions which a patient with total brain failure still
exhibits, it also contended that "[e]ven with extraordinary medical
care, these functions cannot be sustained indefinitely-typically, no
longer than several days."' 75 This is contrary to Shewmon's research
which demonstrates that patients with total brain failure have lived for
months, and in some cases, even years.176
Furthermore, the Commission was wrong about the implications
of total brain failure. The Commission was under the impression that
total brain failure leads to the death of the human body as a whole.177
It explained, " [t] he functioning of many organs ... are mutually inter-
dependent, so that the loss of any part [of the organ system] leads to
the breakdown of the whole [system] and, eventually, to the cessation
of functions in every part."' 78 It contended that when the brain dies,
"[a]rtificial support for the heart and lungs .. . cannot maintain the
usual synchronized integration of the body."'79 However, Shewmon's
research demonstrating the existence of a number of integrative func-
tions, which patients with total brain failure exhibit, undermines this
assertion.
Twenty-seven years (and much controversy) later, the 2008 Presi-
dent's Council on Bioethics (Council)' 80 recognized the need to
develop a new biological rationale for the neurological criterion in
light of the evidence that patients diagnosed with total brain failure
continue to exhibit a number of integrative functions. Unfortunately,
173 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDI-
CAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 33-35.
174 Id. at 33 ("Since life is a matter of integrating the functioning of major organ
systems, breathing and circulation are necessary but not sufficient to establish that an
individual is alive. When an individual's breathing and circulation lack neurologic
integration, he or she is dead.")
175 Id. at 35.
176 See supra Part III.B.
177 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 11, at 32-35.
178 Id. at 32.
179 Id. at 34.
180 The 2008 President's Council is similar to the 1981 President's Commission, in
that they were both special task forces ordained by the President to undertake specific
research.
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the Council's rationale is even less convincing than the one proposed
in 1981. The Council abandoned reliance on the concept of integra-
tion and the false assumption that the brain is the integrator of vital
functions.18' Instead, it focused on the "fundamental vital work of a
living organism-the work of self-preservation, achieved through the
organism's need-driven commerce with the surrounding world."18 2
The Council explained that the work of an organism depends on
three fundamental capacities, all of which are absent in patients with
total brain failure. These fundamental capacities include: (1) open-
ness to the world or receptivity to stimuli, (2) the ability to act upon
the world to obtain what the organism needs, and (3) the basic felt
need that drives the organism to act to obtain what it needs.18 3
Because the patient with total brain failure does not exhibit these
functions, "total brain failure can continue to serve as a criterion for
declaring death-not because it ... indicates complete loss of inte-
grated somatic functioning, but because it is a sign that this organism
can no longer engage in the essential work that defines living
things."' 84
However, the Council's new rationale suffers from the argument
that the integrative functions that continue in patients with total brain
failure do, in fact, signify the essential work that defines living things.
It is difficult to see how proportional growth and sexual maturation of
a child with total brain failure, and the successful gestation of a fetus
in a pregnant woman with total brain failure, do not qualify as "essen-
tial work that defines living things." Furthermore, maintaining home-
ostasis through the functions of the liver, kidneys, and cardiovascular
and endocrine systems also represents the "work" of a living thing.
Finally, the Council claimed that patients with total brain failure do
not exhibit "openness to the world" or "receptivity to stimuli," but
patients with total brain failure develop a fever in response to infec-
tion and have the ability to fight infections and foreign bodies. In
addition, these patients exhibit cardiovascular and hormonal stress
responses to unanesthetized incision for organ procurement. In sum,
the functions and responses of patients with total brain failure dis-
credit the Council's rationale for the neurological standard.
181 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BiOETHICS, supra note 8, at 60.
182 Id.
183 See id. at 61.
184 Id. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
[VOL. 87:41772
A CALL TO REJECT THE NEUROLOGICAL STANDARD
VI. CALL TO ABANDON THE DEAD DONOR RuLE
If we reject the neurological standard as a criterion for determin-
ing death and return to employing only the cardiopulmonary stan-
dard, the supply of organs-which is already far too low to meet the
demand-will plummet. In 2007, close to ninety-two percent of all
donated cadaveric organs came from donors declared dead by the
neurological standard.185 This Note argues that if we are to do away
with the neurological standard, which we should, we must abandon
the DDR as well, in order to preserve the organ transplantation
system.
In certain circumstances, namely where informed consent has
been obtained, death may not be a necessary precondition to vital
organ donation. Even though patients with total brain failure can be
maintained for months, "given their permanent loss of consciousness
and inability to interact with others, nearly everyone agrees that no
humanly meaningful life remains."186 In addition, because these
patients have perfusing organs, they are ideal candidates for dona-
tion.187 Even though these patients may be alive under the cardi-
opulmonary standard when they are diagnosed with total brain
failure, it may be appropriate to procure their organs if they, through
the use of an advance directive' 88 or their authorized representatives,
have clearly expressed their wishes to serve as donors in this situation.
Abandoning the DDR may seem like a radical change, but procuring
organs from patients with total brain failure already violates the DDR,
because these patients are still living.'89 Furthermore, there is evi-
dence that people who are already aware of the distinction between
total brain failure and death are comfortable with organ donation
when a patient has suffered total brain failure.o90
Two conditions should always be met when one decides to donate
organs after total brain failure. First, the choice to end life support
should always be made before and independent of the choice to
donate organs. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act prohibits any physi-
cian who attends the patient at the time of death, or who declares the
185 See Brody, supra note 92, at F7.
186 Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 569-70.
187 See id. at 570.
188 Advance directives are legal documents that allow people to convey their deci-
sions about end-of-life care ahead of time.
189 See Miller & Truog, supra note 133, at 40.
190 See Shah & Miller, supra note 4, at 575.
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patient's death, from being a member of the transplantation team. 191
In addition to this safeguard, the clinicians who seek consent to organ
donation should always be different from those professionals involved
in the organ procurement process.192 This will help to deter any
incentive on the part of the organ transplantation team to pressure a
family to consent to organ donation.
Secondly, in order to reconcile this Note's proposal to abandon
the DDR with the fact that the patient is still living when the organs
are procured, it is important to understand the impossibility of a total
brain failure patient's recovery. No patient diagnosed with total brain
failure has ever recovered the capacity to breathe spontaneously.19 3
More importantly, no patient diagnosed under the neurological stan-
dard has ever shown any signs of consciousness-including the mini-
mal and ambiguous signs displayed by patients in a PVS.194 Further,
since 1968, total brain failure has been understood as legitimating
both the withdrawal of life support and the procurement of organs.
Both of these actions remain ethically appropriate when patients with
total brain failure are understood to be alive under the cardiopulmo-
nary standard but in a state of irreversible coma.195
A. Grounding the Integrity of the Organ Donation Process in Informed
Consent and the Constitutional Right to Personal Liberty
The DDR helps to ensure the integrity of the organ transplanta-
tion process.196 Abandoning the DDR would be a dangerous proposi-
tion if the organ transplantation system was left without a guiding
principle to ensure the integrity of the process and to curb abuse.
The solution is to ground the validity of the organ transplantation
system in the constitutional right to personal liberty and the common
law notion of informed consent. The courts' jurisprudence in this
area can provide support for the notion that competent patients,
through the use of an advance directive or a surrogate, have a liberty
interest in donating their organs when they have been diagnosed with
total brain failure. This is not to say that the precedent reflects a right
to determine one's fate in the face of imminent death, but there are
191 See Alexandra K Glazier, "The Brain Dead Patient Was Kept Alive" and Other Dis-
turbing Misconceptions: A Call for Amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 9 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 640, 645-46 (2000).
192 See Miller & Truog, supra note 133, at 44.
193 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 8, at 45.
194 See id.
195 See Miller & Truog, supra note 133, at 41.
196 See id. at 38.
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compelling arguments to be made in favor of a constitutional right to
donate one's organs.
B. The Supreme Court's Personal Liberty Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's personal liberty jurisprudence began with
the recognition of a right to privacy, but then in the 1990s the Court
used the term "personal liberty" to protect many of the same rights it
had once recognized under the right to privacy.' 97 The Court's recog-
nition of a right to privacy was firmly established in Griswold v. Connect-
icut.198 There, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that banned
the use of contraceptives by married couples on the grounds that it
violated the right of marital privacy.' 99 Although the Constitution
does not explicitly mention "privacy," the Court found that the right
could be implied from the Bill of Rights. 200 It reasoned that the spe-
cific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have "penumbras formed by ema-
nations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."201 The Court held that "[v]arious guarantees" of the Bill
of Rights created "zones of privacy."202 The Court relied on earlier
precedent involving the rights of people to make personal decisions
about their families and procreation in its recognition of a sphere of
privacy.203
Since Griswold, the Court has recognized a right to privacy in a
number of contexts, including the recognition of an unmarried
couple's right to use contraceptives in Eisenstadt v. Baird04 and a
woman's right to obtain an abortion in Roe v. Wade.205 Eisenstadt was
significant because it expanded the right enjoyed by married couples
to use contraceptives recognized in Griswold to unmarried people.206
In doing so, the Court reasoned that if under Griswold, the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, then
a ban on the distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible.207 The Court acknowledged that in Griswold the right
197 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
198 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
199 See id. at 485.
200 See id. at 484.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See id. at 485.
204 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
205 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
206 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
207 See id.
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of privacy inhered in the marital relationship. 208 However, it altered
that analysis by recognizing that the "marital couple is not an indepen-
dent entity ... but an association of two individuals each with a sepa-
rate intellectual and emotional makeup."209 It then proclaimed that
" [i] f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child."210 The right to an abortion,
recognized in Roe v. Wade, was also grounded in this right to
privacy.211
Nineteen years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey,212 the Court reaffirmed the right to have an abortion
recognized in Roe.213 At issue in Casey were five provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, which all restricted a
woman's right to an abortion in some way.214 Although the Court
upheld some of the restrictions and rejected others, Casey's central
holding reaffirmed a woman's right to an abortion.215 The "privacy"
rubric employed in Griswold and Eisenstadt is absent in Casey. Instead,
the focus is on the textual guarantee of "liberty" and not the
unenumerated right of privacy.
208 See id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). It should be noted that substantive
due process jurisprudence has been criticized for its recognition of rights not found
in the Constitution. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is not empowered to rewrite the Constitution, but through its trans-
formation of the Fourteenth Amendment has done so); John Hart Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing Roe for its
recognition of a due process right not found in the Constitution).
212 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
213 See id. at 846.
214 See id. at 844. The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her
informed consent prior to the abortion procedure and specifies that she be provided
with certain information at least twenty-four hours before the abortion is performed.
See id. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of
one of her parents but provides for ajudicial bypass option if the minor does not wish
to or cannot obtain a parent's consent. See id. Another provision of the Act requires
that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign
a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion.
See id. Finally, the Act also imposes certain reporting requirements on facilities that
provide abortion services. See id.
215 Id. at 846.
1776 [VOL. 87:4
2012] A CALL TO REJECT THE NEUROLOGICAL STANDARD
In its analysis, the Casey Court described the Due Process Clause
as "a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter."216 It noted that the
Constitution affords protection to personal decisions relating to the
following areas: "marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education."217 The Court explained that
these matters are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment because they "involv[e] the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime."218 In particular, the Court
found that a woman's decision to have an abortion was a choice "cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy."219 The Court recognized that
"[i]t was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe sought to pro-
tect,"220 and therefore reaffirmed its holding.
C. In re Quinlan
A 1976 New Jersey Supreme Court case, In re Quinlan,221 played
an influential role in the recognition of a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment. There, Joseph Quinlan, the father of Karen Ann
Quinlan, a twenty-two year old woman in a PVS, sought to discontinue
the life-sustaining treatment keeping her alive. 222 Joseph Quinlan
relied on the constitutional rights of free exercise of religion, protec-
tion from cruel and unusual punishment, and privacy in seeking judi-
cial authority to withdraw life support.223 He argued that his free
exercise of religion required the court to grant him the authority to
discontinue life support,224 but the court rejected this argument. 225
The court also rejected Joseph Quinlan's argument that the continu-
ance of life-sustaining procedures was cruel and unusual punish-
ment.226 It found that the Eighth Amendment protection was not
relevant in situations other than the imposition of penal sanctions.227
216 Id. at 847.
217 Id. at 851.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 853.
221 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
222 See id. at 651. It is important to clarify here that Quinlan had not suffered total
brain failure, as this Note has addressed, but was in a PVS. Id. at 654.
223 See id. at 653.
224 See id. at 657-58.
225 See id. at 661-62.
226 See id. at 662.
227 See id.
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The court did, however, find merit in Joseph Quinlan's argument
invoking the right of privacy in seeking the discontinuance of his
daughter's life-sustaining treatment. The court first concluded that if
Quinlan were competent, she would have the right to refuse life sup-
port.2 28 In reaching this conclusion, it found that there was "no exter-
nal compelling interest of the State [that] could compel [Quinlan] to
endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable months
with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive
or sapient life."229 The court grounded this right to refuse medical
treatment in the right of privacy, reasoning that although the Consti-
tution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, the Supreme
Court has recognized one.2 30 The court concluded that this liberty
interest was broad enough to include a patient's right to decline medi-
cal treatment under certain circumstances. 23'
The court's discussion of the state's interests as weighed against
Quinlan's interest is significant. First, the court identified the claimed
interests of the state as (1) the preservation and sanctity of human life
and (2) the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
according to his best judgment.2 3 2 The court then compared the pre-
sent situation before it with past cases where medical treatments were
ordered by the court.233 It accepted Joseph Quinlan's argument that
Quinlan's present treatment could not cure or improve her condition,
but could only "prolong her inevitable slow deterioration and
death."234 It found Quinlan's case, in which there was no hope for
recovery, to be significantly different from those cases in which the
medical treatment, usually a transfusion, had been required, because
in those cases, the treatment "constituted a minimal bodily invasion
and the chances of recovery and return to functioning life were very
good."2 35 The court then announced a continuum it would use in
228 Id. at 663 ("We have no doubt ... that if [Quinlan] were herself miraculously
lucid for an interval ... and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effec-
tively decide upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the
prospect of natural death.").
229 Id.
230 Id. ("The Court has interdicted judicial intrusion into many aspects of per-
sonal decision, sometimes basing this restraint upon the conception of a limitation of
judicial interest and responsibility, such as with regard to contraception and its rela-
tionship to family life and decision.").
231 See id.
232 See id. The doctors claimed that removing Quinlan from the respirator would
conflict with their professional judgment. See id.
233 See id. at 664.
234 See id. at 663.
235 Id. at 664.
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weighing the state's interest in the preservation of life against the
patient's interest in refusing medical treatment. It explained that the
state's interest in the preservation of life weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the "degree of bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims."2 3 6 The court concluded that " [u] ltimately there
comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State
interest," as they would in Quinlan's case if she were competent to
assert her right to discontinue medical treatment.237
The court then addressed the question of what becomes of the
right to refuse medical treatment once the patient is rendered incom-
petent. Even though the court noted that the affirmation of this right
would ordinarily be based upon Quinlan's competency to assert it,
and that it could not discern her wishes, it concluded that her right of
privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her father.238 The court
emphasized that if this right to resist treatment was "a valuable inci-
dent of [Quinlan's] right to privacy," as the court believed it was, then
the fact that she could not consciously exercise the choice did not
extinguish it.23 9 After finding that the right still existed, the court rec-
ognized that the only practical way to preserve it was to allow Quin-
lan's family to assert it.240
Finally, the court considered the alleged criminal liability that
might attach when the doctors removed the life-sustaining treatment.
The court held that there would be no criminal homicide in the cir-
cumstances of this case because (1) the ensuing death would be from
natural causes, rather than homicide, and (2) even if it were to be
regarded as homicide, it would not be "unlawful."2 4 1 Significantly, the
court drew a distinction between "the unlawful taking of the life of
another and the ending of artificial life-support systems as a matter of
self-determination." 2 4 2 It held that the exercise of a constitutional
right, such as the right to refuse medical treatment recognized here,
was protected from criminal prosecution, and it explained that the
doctors would not be vulnerable to criminal liability because the con-
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 See id.
239 Id. ("If a putative decision by [Quinlan] to permit this non-cognitive, vegeta-
tive existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her
right to privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the
basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.").
240 See id.
241 Id. at 669-70 ("The termination of treatment pursuant to the right of privacy
is, within the limitations of this case, ipso facto lawful.").
242 Id. at 670.
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stitutional protection extends to third parties "whose action is neces-
sary to effectuate the exercise of that right."24 3 It is interesting to note
that Quinlan's respirator was ultimately removed, but to everyone's
surprise, she lived for nine more years.244
D. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
Over a decade later, the Supreme Court considered Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.2 4 5 There, Nancy Beth Cruzan
suffered a severe brain injury in an automobile accident, which ren-
dered her incompetent.246  Her parents sought a court order
directing the withdrawal of her artificial feeding and hydration equip-
ment.24 7 At the time, the state of Missouri had a provision that pro-
hibited the removal of life-sustaining treatment without clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's desire to have life-sustaining
treatment withdrawn under the circumstances. 2 48 In this case, the
Missouri Supreme Court refused to order the removal of Cruzan's life-
sustaining treatment because her family had failed to present clear
and convincing evidence of this desire on her part.2 4 9
By the time the case was brought, some lower courts had
addressed similar cases and had found a right to refuse medical treat-
ment.2 5 0 The Court noted that while Quinlan held that the right to
refuse medical treatment was grounded in the constitutional right to
privacy, after Quinlan, most courts based a right to refuse treatment
either solely on the common law right to informed consent or on both
the common law and a constitutional privacy right.2 5 1 Informed con-
243 Id.
244 Natalie Rezek, Is Self-Harm by Cutting a Constitutionally Protected Right?, 12 QuIN-
NIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 303, 320 n.132 (2009).
245 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
246 See id. at 265. Like Quinlan, Cruzan was in a PVS; she had not suffered total
brain failure.
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977); In re Storar & Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), superseded by statute,
Health Care Decisions Act for Persons With Mental Retardation, N.Y. SCPA Law
§ 1750-b (McKinney 2010).
251 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265; see also Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 435 (relying on both
the right of privacy and the right of informed consent to permit the withholding of
chemotherapy from a profoundly retarded sixty-seven year old man suffering from
leukemia); Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 70 (declining to base a right to refuse treatment on a
constitutional policy right; finding the right adequately supported by the informed
consent doctrine).
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sent derives from the notion at common law that the touching of one
person by another without consent and without legal justification is
battery.252 The Supreme Court explained that this notion of bodily
integrity "has been embodied in the requirement that informed con-
sent is generally required for medical treatment."253 When justice
Cardozo sat on the New York Court of Appeals, he described this doc-
trine in the following words: "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."254 The
"logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the
patient possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment."255
The Supreme Court narrowly framed the issue in Cruzan as
"whether Cruzan has a right ... which would require the hospital to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circum-
stances." 256 The Court first acknowledged that "[t]he principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions." 257 The problem for the Court was that Cruzan was incom-
petent and unable to assert this interest. In Quinlan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found that in order to preserve the right to refuse
medical treatment, it was necessary to allow a surrogate decision
maker to assert it on behalf of the incompetent patient.258 However,
the Supreme Court disagreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court on
this issue; it was unwilling to give a surrogate the full extent of the
competent patient's right. Here, Missouri did recognize that, under
certain circumstances, a surrogate may act for the patient in removing
life-sustaining treatment, but it required clear and convincing evi-
dence of the patient's wishes.259 The Court held that the Constitution
did not forbid Missouri from requiring the party seeking to remove
the treatment to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that removal
is what the patient would have wanted. 260
252 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
253 Id.
254 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
255 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
256 Id. at 269.
257 Id. at 278.
258 See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
259 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
260 See id.
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In upholding Missouri's evidentiary requirement, the Court bal-
anced the individual's liberty interests against the state's interests.261
The Court conceded that it "assume [d] that the United States Consti-
tution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."262 But, the Court
recognized a number of state interests involved in the decision,
including the protection and preservation of human life.26 3 The
Court concluded that a state may properly decline to make judgments
about the quality of life that an individual may enjoy and simply assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of life.2 6 4 The Court also
found more particular interests in Cruzan's situation, one of which
was Missouri's right to safeguard the personal element of the choice
between life and death by imposing a heightened evidentiary require-
ment to ensure compliance with the patient's wishes.265 The Court
also recognized the state's interest in "guard [ing] against potential
abuses in such situations."26 6 Cruzan's parents alternatively con-
tended that Missouri must accept the "substituted judgment" of close
family members in the absence of clear and convincing evidence, but
the Court rejected this argument on the ground that only the patient
could make this profound decision.267
However, Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that, in
some situations, it may be necessary for a state to honor the right of an
incompetent patient to refuse medical treatment when it is asserted by
a surrogate, absent a showing of clear and convincing evidence. She
began her concurrence by agreeing that "a protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from [the
Court's] prior decisions and that the refusal of artificially delivered
food and water is encompassed within that liberty interest."268 Nota-
bly though, Justice O'Connor explained that she wrote separately to
emphasize that "the Court does not today decide the issue whether a
State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate deci-
sionmaker."269 Justice O'Connor recognized that this may be "consti-
261 See id. at 279.
262 Id.
263 See id. at 280.
264 See id. at 282.
265 See id. at 281 ("Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal ele-
ment of [the choice to refuse life-sustaining treatment] through the imposition of
heightened evidentiary requirements.").
266 Id.
267 Id. at 285-86 ("[W] e do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State to
repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself.").
268 Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
269 Id. at 289.
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tutionally required" in some cases in order to protect the patient's
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. 270 She reasoned that
because most people do not provide explicit instructions regarding
their intent to refuse medical treatment should they become incom-
petent, states that refuse to consider any evidence other than these
instructions will sometimes fail to honor a patient's intent.271 Justice
O'Connor suggested that states could more faithfully honor a
patient's wishes by considering what she deemed "an equally proba-
tive source of evidence," namely, "the patient's appointment of a
proxy to make health care decisions on her behalf."272 Justice
O'Connor concluded her opinion by emphasizing that the Supreme
Court has left the surrogate decision making question open:
Today's decision, holding only that the Constitution permits a State
to require clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's desire
to have artificial hydration and nutrition withdrawn, does not pre-
clude a future determination that the Constitution requires the
States to implement the decisions of a patient's duly appointed
surrogate.273
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice
Blackmun, argued that Missouri's evidentiary requirement was an
impermissible burden on the fundamental right to refuse medical
treatment. In its due process analysis, the Court asks whether the lib-
erty interest is "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."' 274 justice Brennan contended that the interest in freedom
from medical treatment satisfied this standard.275 He deemed
Cruzan's right "fundamental" and not outweighed by any interests of
the state.276 Justice Brennan described the standard to be applied
when a fundamental right is at issue in this way: "[I]f a requirement
imposed by a State 'significantly interferes with the exercise of a fun-
damental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by suffi-
ciently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests.' "277 He explained that an evidentiary rule "must
270 Id.
271 See id. at 289-90.
272 Id. at 290. Justice O'Connor noted that these procedures for surrogate deci-
sion making are gaining in acceptance and that they "may be a valuable additional
safeguard of the patient's interest in directing his medical care." Id. at 291-92.
273 Id. at 292.
274 Id. at 304. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
192 (1986)).
275 See id. at 305.
276 Id. (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
277 Id. at 303 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
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meet these standards if it significantly burdens a fundamental liberty
interest," and he then contended that the Missouri evidentiary
requirement failed this test.2 7 8
Justice Brennan then addressed the question of what happens to
the right to refuse medical treatment once the patient is rendered
incompetent and can no longer assert it. Like the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Quinlan, he embraced the notion that an incompe-
tent patient's right to refuse medical treatment can be asserted by a
surrogate decision maker.279 He argued that Cruzan was not deprived
of this fundamental right when she was rendered incompetent.280 He
explained this by invoking a quotation which specifically referenced
patients with loss of brain function:
The law must often adjust the manner in which it affords rights to
those whose status renders them unable to exercise choice freely
and rationally. Children, the insane, and those who are irreversibly ill
with loss of brain function, for instance, all retain 'rights, 'to be sure, but
often such rights are only meaningful as they are exercised by
agents acting with the best interests of their principals in mind.281
Once Justice Brennan determined that Cruzan's right was funda-
mental, and that she possessed the same right when incompetent that
she would possess if she were competent, he moved to the next step in
the due process analysis: weighing her interest in refusing medical
treatment against a variety of state interests. One asserted state inter-
est was a general interest in the preservation of life, but Justice Bren-
nan contended that "the State has no legitimate general interest in
someone's life . . . that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid
medical treatment."282 Another interest Missouri asserted was an
interest in providing Quinlan with an accurate determination of how
she would exercise her rights under these circumstances. 2 8 3 Through-
out the discussion of this interest, Justice Brennan focused on the
need for accuracy in this determination 284 and ultimately concluded
that Missouri's "safeguard" did not further this interest for a number
of reasons.285 Justice Brennan first noted that the Missouri court's
"exclusion of relevant evidence dispenses with any semblance of accu-
278 Id.
279 See id. at 309 ("[T]he question is not whether an incompetent has constitu-
tional rights, but how such rights may be exercised.").
280 See id.
281 Id. at 309 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988)).
282 Id. at 313.
283 See id. at 315.
284 Id. at 316 ("Accuracy, therefore, must be our touchstone.").
285 See id.
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rate factfinding."286 Further, like Justice O'Connor, he pointed out
that too few people execute wills or advance directives for such an
evidentiary rule to adequately ensure that the wishes of incompetent
patients are honored.287 Cruzan illustrates that the Court has recog-
nized a competent patient's right to refuse medical treatment,
although the fate of that right is unclear once the patient has been
rendered incompetent.
E. Washington v. Glucksberg
Seven years later, the Supreme Court decided Washington v.
Glucksberg.288 At issue there was the State of Washington's ban on phy-
sician-assisted suicide. 2 8 9 Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a doc-
tor prescribes medication that, if taken by the patient, is intended to
cause the patient's death. A group of terminally ill patients, with their
doctors and a nonprofit organization, brought an action claiming that
the Washington statute violated the Due Process Clause.290 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs asserted that the statute violated their liberty inter-
est, which they argued extends to a personal choice to commit
physician-assisted suicide by a mentally competent, terminally ill
adult.29 1 The Court began by examining the nation's history and legal
traditions to determine whether the right asserted was fundamen-
tal.29 2 The Court concluded that because most states had historically
considered suicide and the assistance of suicide crimes, and the
Anglo-American common law tradition had punished suicide for over
700 years, the right to commit suicide was not rooted in the nation's
history and tradition, and thus was not fundamental.293
The respondents acknowledged that while many states prohibited
suicide, the Supreme Court had nonetheless recognized a fundamen-
tal interest in the right to make deeply personal decisions free from
governmental interference. The respondents invoked both Cruzan
and Casey in support of this assertion. 294 The Court distinguished
those cases on the grounds that they turned on the fact that both of
286 Id. at 321 ("The court adverted to no evidence supporting its decision, but
held that no clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence had been presented to
show that [Cruzan] would want to avoid further treatment.").
287 See id. at 323.
288 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
289 See id. at 705-06.
290 See id. at 707-08.
291 See id. at 708.
292 See id. at 710.
293 See id. at 711.
294 See id. at 724.
1785
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
those decisions were deeply rooted in our history and traditions and
were deemed fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty, rather
than on the premise that they involved profoundly personal
decisions.295
The respondents argued that Cruzan had recognized a "liberty
interest in determining the time and manner of one's death."2 9 6 The
Court responded, however, that the holding in Cruzan was more pre-
cise than that; it did not involve a right to die according to one's
wishes, but a right to refuse medical treatment.29 7 The Court rea-
soned that the right recognized in Cruzan was mostly rooted in the
common law notions of battery and informed consent in the medical
context, rather than "abstract concepts of personal autonomy."298 It
also distinguished Cruzan by noting that the right to refuse medical
treatment was rooted in our nation's history and tradition, while sui-
cide and the assistance of suicide were widely condemned.299 Thus,
for the majority, the decision in Cruzan turned on the fundamental
nature of the right as rooted in the nation's history and tradition,
rather than the profoundly personal nature of the decision at issue.
Respondents also used Casey in asserting that the Court's recent
jurisprudence in this area reflects a general tradition of "self-sover-
eignty" and "personal autonomy."30 0 They contended that the deci-
sion whether or not to have an abortion is similar to the decision of
how and when to die because it is one of the most intimate and per-
sonal choices a person may ever make.301 However, as it did in distin-
guishing Cruzan, the Court emphasized that it had found the right to
an abortion fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty. This
understanding, rather than the fact that it was a deeply personal deci-
295 See id. at 727.
296 Id. at 722 (citation omitted).
297 See id. at 723. The Court described its holding in Cruzan much more narrowly:
"We assumed that the Constitution granted competent persons a 'constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.'" Id. (quoting Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)). Before the Court ulti-
mately concluded that Missouri could impose an evidentiary requirement on the dis-
continuance of life-sustaining treatment, it recognized a competent patient's right to
refuse medical treatment in certain circumstances.
298 Id. at 725.
299 See id. ("The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be
just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment,
but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.").
300 Id. at 723-24.
301 Id. at 726 (citation omitted).
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sion, motivated the Court to uphold the liberty interest.302 The Gluck-
sberg Court described the Casey opinion as moving "from the
recognition that liberty necessarily includes freedom of conscience
and belief about ultimate considerations to the observation that
'though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of con-
science and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise."' 303 Finally, it
stated, "That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and per-
sonal decisions are so protected."304
However, under its due process jurisprudence, even if the Court
finds that the right burdened by the governmental action is not funda-
mental, it must still ensure that the action is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.305 Here, the Court recognized a number of
state interests at stake in Washington's assisted-suicide ban, including:
(1) the preservation of human life,306 (2) the prevention of suicide,307
(3) the protection of the integrity of the medical profession,30 (4)
the protection of vulnerable groups, including the poor, elderly, and
disabled persons from abuse, neglect, and mistake,309 and (5) the
avoidance of the possibility that permitting assisted suicide will lead to
the acceptance of voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.310 The Court
302 See id. at 727 ("By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey
described, in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities
and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history and
traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that
they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
303 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1993)).
304 Id. However, six years later in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court recognized the
right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy, finding that "the petitioners [were] enti-
tled to respect for their private lives." 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The Court explained
that the petitioners' "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government." Id. The
Court quoted Casey in support of its decision: "'It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.'" Id. (quot-
ing Casey, 505 U.S. at 847). In its conclusion, the Court held that "l[t] he Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual." Id.
305 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
306 See id.
307 See id. at 730.
308 See id. at 731.
309 See id.
310 See id. at 732.
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easily found that all of these interests were important and rationally
related to Washington's ban on assisted suicide.3 1 '
Justice Stevens's concurrence is significant because in contrast to
the majority opinion, which emphasized the history and tradition of
the rights upheld in Cruzan and Casey, it highlighted the personal
nature of those rights and the implications of the Court's holdings in
those cases. He began by noting that the Court had decided that
Washington's statute was valid on its face, and explained that this
holding did not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the
statute may be unconstitutional.3 1 2
Justice Stevens then linked the Cruzan Court's vindication of
Cruzan's right to refuse medical treatment to its implicit recognition
of her right to "affirmative conduct that would hasten her death."313
While the majority emphasized that its decision in Cruzan was
grounded in the common law notion of informed consent, Justice Ste-
vens argued that there was another source of Cruzan's interest. He
contended that this right was derived from a "far broader and more
basic concept of freedom that is even older than the common law," a
freedom which "embraces not merely a person's right to refuse a par-
ticular kind of unwanted treatment, but also her interest in dignity,
and in determining the character of the memories that will survive
long after her death."3 14 Justice Stevens explained that when the
Court recognized a competent patient's right to refuse medical treat-
ment, it relied not simply on the common law right to refuse medical
treatment, "but-at least implicitly-on the even more fundamental
right to make this 'deeply personal decision.'"3 1 5 This was precisely
the line of reasoning the Glucksberg respondents employed in their
argument that the Cruzan Court had recognized a right to liberty
broad enough to encompass the right to commit physician-assisted
suicide. Justice Stevens explained that "the common-law right to pro-
tection from battery, which included the right to refuse medical treat-
ment in most circumstances, did not mark 'the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty' that supported the Cruzan family's deci-
311 See id. at 735 ("We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these
various interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and Washing-
ton's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion and
protection.").
312 See id. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring).
313 Id. at 743.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 744 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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sion to hasten Nancy's death."3 16 He argued that Cruzan gave recogni-
tion "not just to vague, unbridled notions of autonomy, but to the
more specific interest in making decisions about how to confront an
imminent death."3 1 7 Although the majority in Glucksberg rejected the
notion of a liberty interest in committing physician-assisted suicide by
characterizing the decisions in Cruzan and Casey as turning on the
fundamental nature of the rights, rather than the profoundly personal
nature of the decisions, the concurrences challenge this assertion.
F Applying the Precedent to Organ Donation After Total Brain Failure
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided a case concern-
ing the right of a patient to donate organs after total brain failure, the
Court's recognition of the right to liberty in making certain pro-
foundly personal decisions provides support for the proposed right.
The Court has indicated two sources of the rights it has recognized in
the context of imminent death, which can both be employed in the
argument for a right to consent to organ donation after total brain
failure. The first is the constitutional right of personal liberty, and the
second is the common law notion of informed consent.
A right to consent to organ donation could be recognized as a
right to personal liberty because of the profoundly personal nature of
the decision to donate one's organs. The Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence in this area, beginning with Griswold and including Eisenstadt,
Roe, and Casey, equates the right to liberty with the right to make per-
sonal decisions free from state interference. Although Griswold
grounded the right to use contraceptives in marital privacy, Eisenstadt
rejected this notion when it recognized the right of individuals to use
contraceptives.318 Further, Casey highlighted the various areas in
which the Court has recognized the right of personal liberty outside
the contraceptive and abortion context.319 Casey noted that the Con-
stitution affords protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.3 2 0 And Cruzan extended this protection to end-of-life deci-
316 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848
(1993)).
317 Id. at 745.
318 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
319 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (listing marriage, family relationships, child rearing,
and education).
320 See id.
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sions. The Casey Court explained that these matters are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because they
"involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime."321 With this language, the Court equated liberty to a
right of privacy in decision making in certain realms of life. It elabo-
rated on this right by stating:
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 322
The right to consent to organ donation after total brain failure is
one of the "most intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime."323 Further, this interest is likely encompassed in the right
to "define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life."3 2 4
Although the Glucksberg Court emphasized that the holdings of
Cruzan and Casey turned on the fact that the Court found the respec-
tive rights fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered lib-
erty, rather than the personal nature of the decisions at issue, Cruzan
and Casey, along with Stevens's concurrence in Glucksberg, rebut this
argument. First, in Cruzan, the Court was concerned with Missouri's
right to "safeguard the personal element of [the] choice" between life
and death.325 The Court found that the state's interest in honoring
the incompetent patient's personal choice was important enough to
justify Missouri's clear and convincing evidence requirement.326 JUS-
tice O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan also emphasized the signifi-
cance of respecting the patient's personal decision in this context.
She approached the issue from a different angle than the majority by
arguing that states should consider evidence other than a patient's
explicit instructions so as to ascertain the patient's intent with greater
accuracy.327
In addition, Justice Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg challenged
the majority's assertion that the rights recognized in Cruzan and Casey
were not products of the personal nature of the decisions at issue. He
argued that the Court's recognition of Cruzan's interest in refusing
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
326 See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
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medical treatment did not rest solely on the common law notion of
informed consent, but at least implicitly, "on the even more funda-
mental right to make this 'deeply personal decision.' 3 28 Justice Ste-
vens explained that the freedom the Court has recognized in its
personal liberty cases "embraces not merely a person's right to refuse
... unwanted treatment, but also her interest in dignity, and in deter-
mining the character of the memories that will survive long after
death."329 The right to decide whether to consent to organ donation
after total brain failure is encompassed in the patient's interest in dig-
nity and in determining the character of the memories that will sur-
vive after her death.
Lastly, Justice Stevens stated that Cruzan "g[ave] recognition, not
just to vague, unbridled notions of autonomy, but to the more specific
interest in making decisions about how to confront an imminent
death."3 30 The broad recognition of the freedom the Court has recog-
nized in this area applies to the context of organ donation. The deci-
sion to consent to organ donation after total brain failure is made
under similar circumstances as the decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment and thus, patients should have the right to exercise the
same autonomy in both situations. The decision to donate organs
after total brain failure is as personal as any of the decisions the
Supreme Court has recognized within the right to personal liberty.
Although the Glucksberg majority refused to recognize a liberty
interest in committing physician-assisted suicide, 331 the right to
donate one's organs after total brain failure, through an advance
directive, is more like the right recognized in Cruzan, namely, the
right of a competent adult to refuse unwanted medical treatment,332
than the right to commit physician-assisted suicide. Cruzan extended
the reach of the Due Process Clause to the right of a competent adult
to determine the time and manner of his death by allowing the
patient to refuse medically necessary nutrition and hydration. With
this liberty interest affirmed, the recognition of the right to donate
one's organs after total brain failure is just a small step for the Court
to take. The decision to donate one's organs after total brain failure
falls firmly within the liberty interest in determining the manner of
328 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 744 (1997) (StevensJ., concurring)
(quoting Cruzan, 479 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
329 Id. at 743.
330 Id. at 745.
331 See id. at 728.
332 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (1990) ("The principle that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
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one's death. Further, Justice O'Connor's emphasis on the need to
honor a patient's wishes in her Cruzan concurrence 3 3 3 lends support
to the notion of a constitutional right to donate one's organs after
total brain failure. Where a person has evidenced a choice to donate
his organs should he ever suffer total brain failure, his liberty interest
in donating deserves to be protected under the Due Process Clause.
The courts' jurisprudence regarding the common law notion of
informed consent also lends support to the right to donate organs in
the context of total brain failure. While on the surface informed con-
sent entails a right to be free from touching or battery, there is some-
thing more fundamental to the concept. As Justice Cardozo put it,
the concept entails "a right to determine what shall be done with
[one's] own body."33 4 When informed consent is framed in this way,
it can be applied to the right to decide whether or not to donate
organs in certain circumstances.
The first major premise to glean from the Supreme Court's per-
sonal liberty jurisprudence is its recognition of a competent person's
unqualified right to refuse medical treatment.335 The New Jersey
Supreme Court first proposed this notion in Quinlan33 6 and the
Supreme Court affirmed it in Cruzan.33 7 Where the Supreme Court
has had trouble is with what should be done in the absence of an
advance directive, where the state cannot be sure of an incompetent
person's wishes. In Cruzan, it held that the State of Missouri was per-
mitted to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent
patient's wishes before the removal of life-sustaining treatment. Up
until this point, this Note has only argued that a patient with total
brain failure should be able to consent to organ donation through an
advance directive, but the absence of evidence of an incompetent per-
son's wishes is likely to be common in cases of organ donation after
total brain failure, as it has been common in the cases the Court has
considered. Thus, this Note now turns to its argument that in the
absence of an advance directive, surrogate decision makers should be
able to consent to organ donation on behalf of patients with total
brain failure.
There is considerable support in the case law for allowing a surro-
gate decision maker to assert the right to refuse medical treatment,
333 See id. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
334 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
335 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (1990) ("The principle that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
336 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
337 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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which can be invoked in the argument for honoring a surrogate deci-
sion maker's assertion of an incompetent patient's right to donate
organs after total brain failure.3 38 In Quinlan, the Supreme Court of
NewJersey recognized that the only practical way to preserve the right
to refuse medical treatment after the patient is rendered incompetent
is to allow a surrogate to assert it.339 The court honored Joseph Quin-
lan's assertion of Quinlan's right to refuse medical treatment.340
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan lends further support
to the notion that a surrogate should be permitted to assert a dying
patient's right when that patient has been rendered incompetent. 341
She wrote separately in Cruzan to emphasize that the Court did not
decide the issue of whether the State must give effect to the decisions
of a surrogate. 342 justice O'Connor emphasized the importance of
honoring the patient's intent and concluded that, because most peo-
ple do not prepare advance directives or provide instructions regard-
ing their intent to refuse medical treatment, states that only consider
this type of evidence in making the determination about the incompe-
tent patient's intent will sometimes be wrong. In her concurrence,
she suggested that the appointment of a proxy to make health care
decisions in the event of incompetence could further the asserted
goal of honoring the patient's wishes. This same reasoning is applica-
ble in the context of organ donation after total brain failure.
CONCLUSION
We ought to reject the neurological criterion for determining
death and return to using only the cardiopulmonary standard. Both
Jonas and Shewmon launched major attacks on the Harvard commit-
tee's proposal of the neurological criterion. Jonas's concern was with
the uncertainty that surrounds the determination of death according
to the neurological standard. Shewmon's research challenged the
assumptions upon which the neurological criterion was based. He
demonstrated that the functioning of the heart and lungs does not
338 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court did not decide the issue whether a state must also give effect to the decisions of
a surrogate decision maker, and that such a duty may be constitutionally required in
some circumstances, because few individuals provide explicit instructions regarding
their intent to refuse medical treatment should they become incompetent); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976) (concluding that an incompetent patient's right to
privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her guardian).
339 See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 (1976).
340 See id.
341 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
342 See id. at 289.
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necessarily immediately cease after total brain failure and that, in fact,
patients with total brain failure can continue to exhibit heart and lung
functioning with the help of a ventilator for months, and in some
cases, even years. Shewmon's research also revealed that patients who
have suffered total brain failure continue to exhibit a number of
integrative functions, including maintenance of body temperature,
proportional growth, sexual maturation, and elimination of waste. In
light of this evidence, the risk of the public's confusion about the cri-
terion, and the President's Commission's unpersuasive rationales for
the standard, this Note proposes a rejection of the neurological stan-
dard and a return to the use of only the cardiopulmonary criterion in
determining death.
Because the majority of cadaveric donors are determined dead by
the neurological standard, and the organ supply is already far too low
to meet the demand, it is also necessary to abandon the dead donor
rule in order to preserve the organ transplantation system. In the
absence of the dead donor rule, the ethical integrity of the organ
donation process can be grounded in the constitutional right to per-
sonal liberty and the common law notion of informed consent.
The Supreme Court's personal liberty jurisprudence in Griswold,
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey provides support for the recognition of a
competent adult's constitutional right to donate organs after total
brain failure by way of an advance directive. The decision to donate
one's organs is just as personal as any of the rights recognized in the
above cases. Furthermore, Quinlan, Cruzan, and Glucksberg demon-
strate that the Court has recognized some extent of personal auton-
omy in the face of imminent death. This notion of personal
autonomy is applicable to the decision of whether to donate one's
organs after total brain failure.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Somatically Integrative Functions Not Mediated by the
Brain and Possessed by Some Patients with Total Brain Failure3 43
Homeostasis of a variety of mutually interacting chemicals through
the functions of liver, kidneys, cardiovascular, and endocrine
systems.
Elimination, detoxification and recycling of cellular wastes through
the body.
Energy balance, including interactions among liver, endocrine
systems, muscle and fat.
Maintenance of body temperature (albeit at a lower than normal
level and with the help of blankets).
Wound healing, the capacity for which is diffuse throughout the
body.
Fighting of infections and foreign bodies through interactions
among the immune system, lymphatics, and bone marrow.
Development of fever in response to infection.
Cardiovascular and hormonal stress responses to unanesthetized
incision for organ retrieval.
Successful gestation of a fetus in a woman with total brain failure.
Sexual maturation of a child with total brain failure.
Proportional growth of a child with total brain failure.
343 Shewmon, supra note 105, at 467-68.
20121 1795
1796 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:4
